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Abstract
We present a rewriting logic semantics in Maude of the ABEL hardware description language. Based on this
semantics, and on Maude’s underlying LTL model checker, we propose a scalable formal analysis framework
and tool for hardware/software co-design. The analysis method is based on trace checking of ﬁnite system
behaviors against LTL temporal logic formulas. The formal properties of the hardware, the embedded
software, and the interactions between both can all be analyzed this way. We present two case studies
illustrating our method and tool.
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1 Introduction
The restricted class of functionality required of an embedded system suggests the
possibility that its hardware and software components might be designed concur-
rently, commonly called hardware/software co-design [18]. The typical target for a
co-design is much more limited than a general purpose microprocessor: it is usu-
ally an embedded system such as those found in consumer electronics or in control
systems of various kinds, for example, those found in automobiles or power plants.
One important recent trend with many applications is towards distributed embedded
systems having their own communication resources and being connected through
wireless networks. In sheer size, the number of such systems now dwarfs by several
orders of magnitude the number of standard computers.
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Co-design engineering is a complex process that goes well beyond simply dele-
gating tasks to the appropriate engineer. A critical step in the co-design process,
though not necessarily the ﬁrst, is to partition the system into major functional
blocks, and then to match these functional blocks with speciﬁc design technologies.
In particular, a decision is made as to which components will be implemented as
hardware and which will be implemented as software. The choices made during
this step impact directly the cost and complexity of implementing the system, as
well as the implementation’s performance. A system that is required to compute
Fourier transforms, for example, could choose to do so in software on a general
purpose microprocessor, in software on a digital signal processor (DSP), or directly
in hardware as part of an application-speciﬁc integrated circuit (ASIC).
Contemporary research into embedded system design [22,13,7] has advocated a
signiﬁcant change to the process outlined above, whereby the major functionalities
are ﬁrst modeled at a high level before being mapped to speciﬁc technologies, such
as a DSP or ASIC. Modeling is realized through a collection of formalisms covering
a variety communication, concurrency, and computation schemes. In the Ptolemy II
system design environment [13], for example, an engineer can describe computations
using combinations of the many supported models, including data-ﬂow network and
discrete-event models. By separating functionality from implementation, tools such
as Ptolemy II attempt to coordinate the system design process and produce veriﬁed
designs more quickly by leveraging modularity and abstraction. In limited cases,
automated tools have been able to produce implementations directly from these
high-level models.
1.1 Embedded System Veriﬁcation
Our view of co-veriﬁcation, that is, the process and mechanisms through which a
co-design is veriﬁed, is summarized by the generalized diagram presented as Fig.
1. Depending on the particular veriﬁcation regime applied and the level at which
the system’s components are described, the individual boxes can be resolved more
concretely. In this paper we focus on co-veriﬁcation of implementation level designs,
and in particular we focus on the hardware/software interactions at this level. We
see this work as being part of a longer term and more ambitious project to for-
mally specify and analyze embedded systems, especially the real-time and hybrid
components of a system’s operating environment.
Regarding Fig. 1, we need a natural hardware model to capture implementation
level designs. Register-transfer level (RTL) code is the most pervasive and natural
choice, encompassing (subsets of) well known hardware description languages (HDL)
such as Verilog and VHDL. For our work in this paper, however, we chose another
language, ABEL [24], which is owned by Xilinx Inc. and is primarily used to
program FPGAs, a widely utilized technology in embedded systems. For a piece
of software to be able to ‘run’ on a hardware component designed in ABEL, it
must be at a level that the hardware can understand, and so we have focused on
assembly language programming for our software model. The exact format and set
of instructions allowed as part of the assembly code must be tailored to the particular
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Fig. 1. Co-veriﬁcation Overview
microprocessor that it is targeting. Therefore, the veriﬁcation environment must
be updated to support a new instruction set when analyzing a new microprocessor
component.
The ﬁnal component in Fig. 1 is reserved for specifying what should be veri-
ﬁed, which in our case will be properties of RTL microprocessors and of assembly
language programs written to run on those processors. There are many interest-
ing properties about these systems that can only be described with properties that
span hardware, software, and meta-level properties of the software and its data
structures. The goal of this paper is to demonstrate the natural way in which
rewriting logic can be used to unify the varying levels at which the properties need
to be described, so that they can be reasoned about together. For this purpose we
present a Maude-based co-veriﬁcation environment.
The particular veriﬁcation methodology that our environment supports is a very
practical kind of formal analysis, namely trace checking, a formal method widely
used for verifying both hardware [4,1,6] and software [11,19]. In trace checking,
formal properties expressed as temporal logic formulas are checked for ﬁnite traces,
or runs, of the system. This has the practical advantage of saving the engineering
eﬀort that would be required to build a self checking test bench to do the same
thing, and helps the validation engineer focus on the properties, rather than on how
they are checked.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents, by way of
ABEL, a high-level overview of how the syntax and semantics of a hardware descrip-
tion language are speciﬁed in Maude. Section 3 explains in detail our framework
for specifying and trace checking co-designs and illustrates our proposed method
through two in-depth case studies. Section 4 discusses related work, and Section 5
presents some conclusions.
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module "DFFE"
declarations
’D, ’EN input pin ;
’Q node istype reg ;
’OUT output pin ;
equations
’Q := ’D ;
when ’EN then
’OUT = ’Q ;
else
’OUT = .Z. ;
end-module
Fig. 2. Example Module and Circuit Diagram
2 Syntax and Semantics for ABEL
This section presents a high-level overview of our ABEL semantics focusing on
major design decisions rather than on the particular details of ABEL. In places
where concreteness can get a point across more quickly, we use ABEL syntax and
explain the necessary details.
Rewriting semantics for many diﬀerent types of programming languages has been
described previously (e.g. see [15]). The goal of this section, in part, is to explain
those areas of the RTL semantics that diﬀer from software languages. Our second
goal, which, in fact, falls out from the ﬁrst, is to give enough semantic detail to
support our discussion of trace checking in §3. Lastly, by way of ABEL speciﬁcally,
we also show that the framework presented in §3 would permit a hardware designer
to build a digital circuit in a way that is consistent with current engineering practice.
2.1 Circuit Semantics
Synchronous digital circuits need to respect two separate notions of execution order.
First, during each clock cycle, the topology of the combinational (non-state carrying)
network must be respected: each internal node value within the circuit is considered
accurate only after its inputs become accurate, and some amount of time has elapsed
to compute the value from the stabilized inputs. Second, latches should respect a
global clock and should all be updated in parallel.
Although a synthesized circuit will mix combinational and sequential elements,
it is convenient for the purposes of simulation to separate the two. Many HDL
simulators do this, whereby the circuit is treated as a combinational network only.
This is accomplished by changing the circuit’s input/output interface to include new
bits for each state element. The new inputs and outputs represent the current-state
and next-state values, respectively. This transformation is used as the basis for our
ABEL semantics.
Each clock cycle, every identiﬁer (speciﬁed in the ABEL modules, that is, in the
ABEL syntax) gets associated with at least one value in the transformed circuit.
These associations take the form of a triple of sort NodeValue, and individual triples
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are gathered together into a set.
op [_,_,_] : NodeType Identifier Value -> NodeValue .
The ﬁrst argument is a token describing what type of node it is in the transformed
circuit: primary input (pi), current-state input (cs), primary output (po), next-
state output (ns), or internal node (in). Fig. 2 shows an ABEL module (suitably
modiﬁed for Maude parsing) that stores a value from the current clock cycle, al-
lowing it to be used during the next clock cycle. Optionally, this output can be
suppressed. The single bit wires, or pins, represented by the identiﬁers ’D and ’EN
are inputs to the module; ’Q is an internal node; and ’OUT is the only output. The
fact that ’Q takes its assigned value during the next clock cycle is speciﬁed with
the istype reg qualiﬁer. In the equations section for the circuit, ’Q is assigned,
for the following clock cycle, the current value of ’D. ’OUT gets the same value as
’Q if the enable pin ’EN is asserted (i.e. has logical value 1), and the special value
.Z. otherwise. The current state of the circuit could look as follows:
[pi, ’D, 0] [pi, ’EN, 1] [cs, ’Q, 1] [ns, ’Q, 0] [po, ’OUT, 1]
Indicating that during the previous clock cycle ’D was 1, and the ’EN pin is asserted.
Our semantics has a single rewrite rule that transitions the current state (a set of
triples of sort NodeValue) to the next clock tick by evaluating the ABEL constructs
in the current state and with user-speciﬁed inputs. The equational rewrite rules
necessary to facilitate the transition from one clock cycle to the next are very much
like the ones used to specify the semantics for a simple imperative programming
language in [15]. Equations are evaluated based on the order in which they are
written down in the module, and, moreover, ABEL only supports what are essen-
tially the equivalent of assignment, if-then-else, and switch statements, which are
very easy to specify. In some cases the semantics proved tedious due to idiosyn-
crasies of ABEL, but were not technically diﬃcult to handle. The major diﬀerence,
then, from the semantics for a simple imperative programming language is that we
explicitly evaluate the “program” over and over again, instead of only once.
An alternative semantics for digital circuits is described in [10], where instead
of a synchronizing rewrite rule, each node value is tagged with the cycle number for
which the node takes on the calculated value. In that scheme, it is not necessary to
have any rewrite rules, but for use with the Maude model checker, it was cleaner
and more useful to specify synchronization as explained above.
3 Trace Checking the Hardware/Software Interface
This section describes how we have designed an eﬀective co-veriﬁcation environment
in Maude for use on implementation level system designs. A large component of our
framework consists of the ABEL semantics presented in §2, so in what follows we
mainly focus on how our framework exploits the ABEL semantics for trace checking.
We describe both how the semantics allows us to use Maude’s LTL model checker
for trace checking, and the related subject of how to build an eﬀective propositional
language for writing meaningful LTL formulas. The language covers hardware,
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software, and meta-level properties of the software and its data structures, so that
all of these entities can be reasoned about together and their interactions can be
explored. §3.2 presents a case study.
3.1 Co-Veriﬁcation Environment
Hardware/software co-design is fundamentally about balance: deciding how the
functionality of a system should be partitioned into hardware and software compo-
nents. Understanding the purpose and goals of the project can help with deﬁning
metrics that guide the engineering team toward a suitable partition, one that strikes
a balance among the various metrics. Common axes that are considered and in-
ﬂuence design decisions include performance, power, size, programmability, and
reduced complexity.
Clearly, the veriﬁcation of a co-design project should include the interactions
between hardware and software; both to ensure system wide correctness and to
validate the engineering choices that led to the partitioning scheme. If, for example,
the instruction throughput is never high enough to take advantage of all of the
functional units, then it might be worthwhile to use this information to reevaluate
the hardware partition and scale back the design. If the software is complicated
and depends on many subtle interactions with the available hardware, then this
ineﬃciency might be very hard to uncover without an implementation to test on,
or without formal analysis. If, as a second example, the co-design eﬀort tried to
minimize power consumption, then it would be useful to formally validate how the
power saving features perform when the software is executing on the chip. Hence,
validation of the co-design decisions after implementation may be necessary to guide
redesign or other eﬀorts in the future.
Creating a Maude speciﬁcation for the semantics of an HDL such as ABEL
represents our ﬁrst step in an eﬀort to facilitate co-veriﬁcation. The strong modeling
properties of rewriting logic, and Maude in particular, allow a user to take both the
hardware and software components of a design and instantly embed them into a
uniﬁed mathematical framework. In addition, meta-level properties of the system
(e.g. software data structures) can also be conveniently modeled and related to the
rest of the design. This allows the engineer to specify properties of his/her system in
the most appropriate and natural language, hence promoting a modular veriﬁcation
eﬀort that abstracts away unnecessary details and helps avoid error-prone encodings.
Our current veriﬁcation framework is built around a combination of simulation
and LTL model checking, called trace checking. For trace checking to be applicable,
the state of the co-designed system must evolve in exactly one way, corresponding
to a concrete simulation run on ﬁxed inputs. Our ABEL semantics supports this
by design: there is only one rewrite sequence, modulo ACI axioms. When using a
propositional model checker such as the one in Maude, it is necessary to develop
a strong propositional language; one that makes it easy to write properties of the
circuit at a high level of abstraction. For example, a circuit design used to control
a traﬃc light should allow the current state of the light to be speciﬁed as red,
yellow, or green, as opposed to the signal values that each color corresponds to in
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Fig. 3. Co-veriﬁcation Environment
the circuit. The same remains true when the model checker is being used for the
more restricted case of trace checking, and so the propositional language that we
have developed for trace checking co-designs has many of these features. On the
hardware side, node values associated with an identiﬁer can be checked using the
propositions
op _asserted : Identifier -> Proposition .
op _deasserted : Identifier -> Proposition .
op _::=_ : Identifier Int -> Proposition .
op _::=_ : Identifier Identifier -> Proposition .
op p : Proposition -> Prop .
For identiﬁers associated with multiple node values in the transformed circuit, the
value used is the one associated with the current-state. Single bit nodes are asserted
if they have the value 1 in the current state, and de-asserted if they have the value
0. Multi-bit values can be checked for equality with an integer constant or with
the value of another multi-bit node, again by checking the current state. The ::=
symbol is used for this purpose, to avoid conﬂicts with other sorts deﬁned in Maude.
In addition, it is convenient and easy to name constant values, such as the colors in
the traﬃc light example. If the module declares each color as a constant value, then
the identiﬁers associated with each constant value can be used directly by writing
’LIGHT ::= ’GREEN
As usual for LTL model checking in Maude, the semantics of state propositions is
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Table 1
Simple Processor ISA:
add (addition) sub (subtraction) mul (multiply)
nand (bitwise nand) lw (load) sw (store)
beq (branch on equal) bgt (branch on greater than) halt
deﬁned equationally, with equations that query the current state values to decide
the truth or falsity of the proposition. For assembly programs we have added other
propositions : for example we have propositions that check for when an instruction
is executed, when an instruction is committed to programmer visible state, and
so on. In the case study we present other abstractions that let us reason about
speciﬁc programs and data structures. Fig. 3 summarizes the components of the
veriﬁcation environment and their dependencies, the solid arrows can be read from
tail to head as ‘is dependent on’.
3.2 A HW/SW Case Study
Our case study has three major components: a simple microprocessor designed
in ABEL, a set of programs for the processor written in assembly, and several
properties to be veriﬁed. All of these components are processed by Maude using
internally deﬁned sorts and operators; the dashed arrows in Fig. 3 show which
modules are responsible for deﬁning these external representations (i.e. RTL and
assembly) that can be processed as terms in Maude.
3.2.1 Simple Microprocessor
Our microprocessor design is based on the classic ﬁve-stage, in-order pipeline ex-
ample from [12] and supports the instruction set architecture (ISA) presented in
Table 1. Notable features that are missing from our processor design, but would
be expected in a full featured chip, include I/O subsystems, caches, and interrupt
handling. All are left for future work. Programs are written under the assumption
of unit latencies and are converted into machine code by the Assembler in Fig.
3. Unit assumed latency means that each instruction dynamically executed on the
processor should be processed as if all preceding instructions had ﬁnished.
Each instruction ﬂows through the ﬁve pipeline stages, eventually ﬁnishing and
updating the programmer-visible state. An instruction is ﬁrst fetched (IF), then
decoded (ID), executed (EX), allowed to access memory (MEM), and, ﬁnally, allowed
to write the register ﬁle (WB). To improve performance, a value that has already
been computed, but has not yet made it back to the register ﬁle, is forwarded
to any instruction that consumes that value. In addition, branches are statically
predicted to be not-taken, and instruction fetch continues speculatively until such
a prediction is proved wrong, at which point the bad instructions are invalidated.
Because memory accesses happen after the execution stage, instructions fetched
during the next cycle after a load and dependent on its result are stalled for one
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cycle in the fetch stage. All of these are interesting features that can be monitored
during simulation. If there is a violation of one of these properties, the executing
software can help to put the trace into a more understandable context. On the
other hand, if a piece of software is producing incorrect results, but the property
passes the test, then the programmer might want to look at the software itself.
3.2.2 Software and Veriﬁcation Examples
The ﬁrst set of formulas that we speciﬁed focus on internal properties of the micro-
processor. The major components that we targeted were the forwarding, branching,
and stall logic. We checked that each instruction gets the appropriate operand val-
ues in the execution stage, that no speculative instructions are allowed to update
the state when a branch is taken, and that only certain conditions cause stalls, and
these stalls are of a ﬁxed number of cycles. Table 2 lists, and gives a short descrip-
tion of, each of the processor-speciﬁc formulas that we veriﬁed. The main property
we use to verify the forwarding logic is hw-02, which is speciﬁed by the LTL formula
op hw-02 : -> Formula .
eq hw-02 =
[] p(((’MEM-WB-valid : 0 asserted)
/\ (’IF-ID-reg-A-used : 3 asserted))
->
((’alu-input-A : 2 ::=
register-value(’IF-ID-reg-A : 3, 0))))
...same for second register source operand.
The propositions above show an addition to the language not described previously,
and which is used to reason about the pipeline stages. The proposition
’alu-input-A : 2 ::= register-value(’IF-ID-reg-A : 3, 0)
evaluates to true when the internal multi-bit node named alu-input-A, which feeds
into the EX stage ALU, carried a value 2 cycles ago that equals the current state of
the register speciﬁed in the ‘A’ position of the instruction word fetched 3 cycles ago.
So the LTL formula basically states that for any instruction which completes, the
register operands it got in the EX stage of the pipeline was equal to the register ﬁle
contents when it committed. Of course, a more complete formula would verify that
the internal signals referenced actually have their intended meaning. However, as
given, the formula would be able to catch most of the common errors with respect
to operand forwarding.
Turning to the software component, we started by writing a bubble sort program
in the assembly language of our microprocessor. In addition to the properties from
Table 2, we added four new ones speciﬁc to the software component and its func-
tionality at the meta-level. Meta-level reasoning is facilitated by deﬁning a sort
function for integer arrays directly in Maude, together with a map that extracts an
array from a software pointer value and length. This makes it possible to compare
the mathematical deﬁnition of a sorted array with the assembly code sorting pro-
gram and its data structures. Getting the pointer and length values for an array
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Table 2
LTL Formulas for Processor Veriﬁcation
Formula Name Description
hw-01 Instructions only stall in IF.
hw-02 ALU operands reﬂect register ﬁle at commit.
hw-03 No stalls longer than 3 cycles.
hw-04 No state change after halt.
hw-05 On branch, next committed instruction is target.
hw-06 r0 is never overwritten.
hw-07 Taken branch ﬂushes IF, ID, and EX.
hw-08 Stalls only occur on branch taken and load-use.
would generally depend on the application binary interface (ABI) for argument and
stack conventions, and also on the array implementation assumed. It would also
rely on the speciﬁc register allocation map used. The ABI would be deﬁned before
any circuit design work is started, and the register map would be known by the
engineer who wrote the assembly code or the compiler that generated it.
Correctness of the the bubble sort program is checked for by an LTL formula that
ensures that whenever there is an inversion in the array, the swap code in the inner
loop is executed at some point in the future. The proposition for checking for an
inversion in an ordered integer array is given by
op inversion : IntArray -> Prop .
eq inversion(IX:Int) = false .
eq inversion(IX:Int, IY:Int, ILX:IntList) =
IX > IY or inversion(IY, ILX) .
In addition to verifying correctness using the inversion check, the running time of
the function can also be monitored. Run time properties can be stated in terms of
the number of cycles, relative to the size of the input array, until the halt instruction
is executed. In the case of bubble sort, this should be some constant multiple of
the square of the array size. For a more sophisticated program it would probably
be convenient to track the running time by inspecting the data structures using an
appropriate meta-level abstraction, like the one for integer arrays. In the case of
sorting, the running time could be speciﬁed in terms of the number of inversions in
the input array, or in the case of matrices some measure of sparsity might be useful.
We also checked that the program is not self-modifying and doesn’t read or write
outside the array boundaries. Table 3 lists all of the properties speciﬁc to the sorting
program, along with a short description for each one. Checking all of the properties
from Tables 2 and 3 for a run of the sorting program with an array of size 13 took
about 4 minutes and 5000 simulation cycles on a 2.5GHz/2GB PowerPC machine.
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Table 3
Formulas for Bubble Sort
Formula Name Description
bs-01 Array inversion leads to swap.
bs-02 Run time is < 10n2 cycles.
bs-03 No self-modifying code.
bs-04 No reads or writes outside the array bounds.
The second program we studied was taken from graphics programming. It is
part of a shader routine that calculates the normal to a surface. Short assembly
code fragments that need to obtain a high percentage of the chip’s theoretical peak
performance are routinely written for low level graphics operations. Using this rea-
soning we set about writing the corresponding code for our microprocessor with the
intent that the instructions should be scheduled for highest performance. Therefore,
we speciﬁed that the code should not have any dynamic pipeline stalls and that it
should complete in less than 100 cycles. All of the properties we checked are given
in Table 4.
Table 4
Formulas for Phong Shader
Formula Name Description
ps-01 No pipeline stalls in the main code body.
ps-02 Computes the correct value.
ps-03 No self-modifying code.
ps-04 No reads or writes outside of array bounds.
ps-05 Finishes in less than 100 cycles.
In trying to schedule the instructions for high performance, we initially made a
mistake that caused the program to compute incorrect results. This was caught by
ps-02 and we updated the code. When we ﬁxed the code, a load-use dependency
was unintentionally created and caused a pipeline stall, this was immediately found
by ps-01 and ﬁxed.
4 Related Work
IBM’s FoCs program [1] turns RCTL [4] assertions into Verilog modules that hook
directly into the simulation infrastructure and monitor execution. When the cir-
cuit is simulated, each of the monitors watches how the system state and internal
signals change over time and reports any problems. SHERLOCK [6] is a second
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trace checking tool for digital circuits. It can check simulation traces for violations
of properties speciﬁed in a linear temporal logic augmented with ﬁrst-order vari-
ables, arrays, and queues. The data structures permit property speciﬁcation at a
higher level of abstraction, thus improving usability and reducing low-level speci-
ﬁcation errors. However, neither of these tools can easily be used to understand
hardware/software interactions.
In the embedded design space, there are industrial tools that allow a certain
degree of hardware/software debugging. The Xilinx EDK [25], for example, allows
the user to debug his/her software with GDB and to scope the internal hardware
signals when a breakpoint is triggered. However, it does not work in the other
direction: hardware events cannot be used to stop the software. Furthermore,
formal analysis is not supported by these debugging tools.
Ptolemy II [13] is a project focusing on embedded system modeling and design.
An entire system, including both hardware and software, can be modeled at varying
levels of abstraction using the supported ‘models of computation’. The intent is for
the modeling of the system to guide its implementation, which in some cases can
even be done automatically from the abstracted view. Ptolemy II captures both
hardware and software components of an embedded system but is not, in particular,
focused on validating a speciﬁc implementation of the system.
Trace checking has also been used successfully in software monitoring. For exam-
ple, see [11,9]. In fact, this has developed into a new software engineering research
area called runtime veriﬁcation [19].
5 Conclusions and Future Work
We have presented a formal semantics in Maude of the ABEL HDL, and have ex-
plained how this executable semantics can be used as the basis of a co-veriﬁcation
framework. To the best of our knowledge, both the ABEL semantics, and the capa-
bilities for trace checking ABEL co-designs are new contributions. Our experience
so far has been quite encouraging, in that rewriting logic and Maude have given
us a ﬂexible framework in which to specify and analyze sophisticated properties of
both the hardware and the software and how they interact. However, this is still
work in progress open to many improvements and new developments. For example,
we should improve the eﬃciency of the HDL simulator to enable larger designs and
also add support for other HDLs, or synthesizable subsets of them. Similarly, we
should incorporate known techniques for optimizing trace checking, so as to help
performance. Also, adding ﬁrst order variables to the speciﬁcation logic would be
extremely useful, and shouldn’t pose a problem for trace checking. Furthermore,
we should develop a larger and more ambitions suite of real-life case studies.
Our longer-term goal is to develop new methods and tools to formally specify
and analyze embedded systems. This paper advances that goal but does not address
a number of important issues that, besides the improvements and extensions men-
tioned above, will be topics of future research. We have pointed out that for many
embedded systems, specifying the environments in which they operate and verify-
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ing the properties related to their interactions with such environments, is as crucial
as specifying and verifying the hardware/software system itself: both tasks should
be done together. Although we have addressed some real-time and performance
issues in our case studies, a full modeling of environments, though very important,
is beyond the scope of this paper. The natural approach for modeling such environ-
ments is viewing embedded systems as real-time systems that can be hybrid, and
can even be both stochastic and hybrid. Therefore, from a rewriting logic perspec-
tive the natural techniques and tools to use will include real-time rewrite theories
[20], probabilistic rewrite theories [3], the modeling of stochastic hybrid systems
[17], and tools such as Real-Time Maude [21] and the upcoming PMaude [3] and
SHYMaude [17]. This should enable us to handle mechanical and sensing interfaces,
such as those in many control systems, for example, anti-lock brakes systems. In the
terminology of this paper it will also provide a natural extension of the meta-level
properties that can be formally speciﬁed and analyzed.
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